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Abstract
In their 2008 paper, Persson and Savulescu suggest that for moral bioenhancement (MBE) to be effective at eliminating the 
danger of ‘ultimate harm’ the intervention would need to be compulsory. This is because those most in need of MBE would 
be least likely to undergo the intervention voluntarily. By drawing on concepts and theories from epidemiology, this paper 
will suggest that MBE may not need to be universal and compulsory to be effective at significantly improving the collec-
tive moral standing of a human populace and reducing the threat of ultimate harm. It will identify similarities between the 
mechanisms that allow biological contagions (such as a virus) and behaviours (such as those concerned with ethical and 
unethical actions) to develop, spread, and be reinforced within a population. It will then go onto suggest that, just as with 
the epidemiological principle of herd immunity, if enough people underwent MBE to reach a minimum threshold then the 
incidence and spread of immoral behaviours could be significantly reduced, even in those who have not received MBE.
Keywords Moral bioenhancement · Epidemiology · Social contagions · Bioethics
Introduction
In their 2008 paper, Persson and Savulescu explored 
whether, given the increasingly destructive potential posed 
by scientific and technological advancements such as nuclear 
and biological warfare, moral bioenhancement (MBE) 
should be developed as a means of closing the gap between 
our moral faculties and destructive capacities (Persson and 
Savulescu 2008). They argued that if the development of 
our destructive capabilities, fuelled by exponential increases 
in our cognitive faculties, continues unabated then it will 
need to be accompanied by research into, and the applica-
tion of, MBE. This is necessary, they argue, as a means to 
avoid what they term ‘ultimate harm’ (UH); humanity’s 
self-inflicted destruction. They posit that because those 
who are most likely to bring about this UH are those same 
individuals who are least likely to undergo voluntary MBE 
if developed and proven to be safe, the intervention should 
be applied on a universal and compulsory scale. Thus, to 
ensure the efficacy of MBE, it should be made obligatory, 
regardless of a person’s original moral baseline.
While they defend this view in their 2013 paper (Pers-
son and Savulescu 2013), their more recent work has moved 
away from this extreme position (Persson and Savulescu 
2015, 2019a, b). However, the question of whether MBE 
should be compulsory, specifically to be effective at reducing 
or eliminating the risk of UH, has remained relatively unex-
amined. This paper will address this gap in the literature. To 
do this, it will explore the idea that by understanding behav-
iour according to epidemiological models, and specifically 
in reference to the phenomena of herd immunity, it may be 
possible for MBE to be effective at reducing or altogether 
avoiding the risk of UH without a need for a compulsory 
enhancement programme.1
First, this paper will provide a fuller account of the erro-
neous reasons why, according to Persson and Savulescu, 
MBE would need to be compulsory. Second, a justifica-
tion for the use of epidemiological models as a means of 
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1 I feel it would be prudent to make the reader aware that this paper 
was written before various governments began floating the idea that 
targeted herd immunity could be a possible long-term method to 
tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. This is something which I fervently 
oppose as this is most often articulated in terms of sacrificing the 
most vulnerable in society to secure not only people’s lives but also 
economies. While I believe such methods are outright monstrous in 
terms of tackling the COVID-19 pandemic, I still believe such model-
ling can be of value in the voluntary vs compulsory MBE debate.
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understanding data transfer and the phenomena of ‘transmis-
sion’ outside the health sciences will be provided, drawing 
on historical and contemporary examples of its application 
in a wide range of fields. Third, a brief account of how the 
vaccine epidemiological effect of herd immunity works 
will be provided with specific attention being drawn to herd 
immunity thresholds and infection chain disruption. Fourth, 
this paper will argue that there are similarities between the 
mechanisms that allow biological contagions (such as a 
virus) and behaviours (such as those concerned with ethical 
and unethical actions) to spread and be reinforced within a 
population. Finally, this paper will argue that if MBE was 
made voluntarily available, it could have the desired effect 
of managing the risk of UH provided that enough of the 
population took the enhancement to reach the behavioural 
equivalent of the herd immunity threshold. However, before 
continuing onto the main body of this paper, some scene-
setting is required.
Assumptions underlying the compulsory 
enhancement question
Over the past decade, there has been considerable ethical 
debate about the conception, development, and theoretical 
implementation of MBE. As identified by Specker et al. 
(2014), these debates can be grouped into the following six 
categories: (1) the need for MBE; (2) the ability to reach 
a consensus on what MBE should involve or what effect 
it should have; (3) how feasible MBE is in relation to the 
current status of scientific research; (4) the ethical value of 
the means and processes at which we arrive at an improved 
morality; (5) what impact such MBE would have on free-
dom, identity, and autonomy on an individual level; and (6) 
what effects MBE would have on social and group dynam-
ics. To focus on the question of whether MBE should be 
employed on a universal compulsory level, this paper makes 
several assumptions about some of the issues in the broader 
MBE debate.2
First, the question this paper is seeking to answer is situ-
ated on the assumption that human moral behaviour, agency, 
insight, and willpower, require improvement and that for 
this reason, MBE is needed. Few would argue that there is 
no such need for improvement. Crucially, however, while 
‘traditional’ moral enhancement is necessary and can make 
some progress towards addressing human moral fault,3 it is 
not up to the task of addressing our collective moral defi-
ciency on its own.4
Second, it will be assumed that there is no principled 
difference between MBE and ‘traditional’ moral enhance-
ment. Neither is seen as being superior to the other regarding 
ethical permissibility or desirability. Thus, there is no innate 
harm in pursuing MBE when compared to ‘traditional’ 
enhancement techniques.
Third, this paper will assume that a consensus has been 
reached regarding what constitutes the ethical good and what 
is morally desirable. Due to the pluralistic milieu in which 
we inhabit, there is considerable debate surrounding what 
traits, behaviours, and positions are considered socially and 
ethically desirable. To advance the debate about MBE provi-
sion, therefore, it is assumed that such desirable characteris-
tics have been identified and agreed.
Forth, while proponents have been optimistic about cur-
rent and future scientific research (Persson and Savulescu 
2012; Douglas 2008; Degrazia 2014), opponents claim that 
due to the complexity of our psychology and biology it is 
unlikely that we will be able to create any form of effective 
MBE (Specker et al. 2014; Arnhart 2010; Sparrow 2014; 
Wiseman 2016; Kudlek 2019). This paper assumes that a 
method of MBE has been developed which demonstrably 
makes individuals more inclined to act in a way that has 
been decided on as morally desirable.
Finally, some assumptions must be made regarding indi-
vidual free will and autonomy, specifically whether those 
individuals who undergo MBE would still be able to make 
independent and autonomous decisions. This paper will 
assume that the form of MBE that could/would be provided 
is one which does not impact on the capacity for autonomous 
decision making. Those who take MBE are as free to make 
their own decisions without undue influence as they were 
before taking the enhancement. It is just that they are likely 
to base those decisions on an ‘improved value system’.
Following all of these assumptions, we can identify the 
characteristics of the MBE which will be under discussion; 
namely, a form of MBE which has been shown to promote 
universally ethically desirable behaviours, under both empir-
ical tests and in ‘real world’ situations, without any impact 
2 It should be noted that while this article makes the following 
assumptions, that is not to say that this article necessarily agrees 
with such assumptions, or that alternative views or conclusions can 
or should be disregarded. This paper is merely utilising these conclu-
sions as a means of better framing the debate with which it is primar-
ily concerned.
3 This article takes traditional MBE to be those forms of societal 
practice which aim, via explicit instruction or passive consciousness-
raising practices, to improve the moral behaviours and ethical under-
standing of individuals (e.g. education, socialisation, etc.).
4 UH, as a founding rationale for MBE, be it voluntary or compul-
sory, has been criticised, most notably by Wiseman (2016). While 
he concedes that the world, as it is currently, is facing significant and 
potentially cataclysmic issues, this does not, in turn, legitimise the 
use of MBE.
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on cognitive ability or autonomous decision making. While 
this may not necessarily be the form of MBE that comes into 
existence, if any do at all, a MBE with these qualities would 
arguably be the most desirable and least contentious form 
of the intervention.
The compulsory MBE debate so far
Persson and Savulescu presented the argument that for 
humanity to have a chance of preventing potentially world-
ending events, the gap between our collective cognitive abil-
ities and our collective moral capabilities must be reduced.5 
Instrumental in achieving this reduction is an effective 
form of MBE. This intervention would be developed and 
implemented to enhance our moral capacity beyond its cur-
rent point, and by doing so, this would enable us to employ 
a morality better suited to ‘good’ uses of our cognitive 
abilities.
They argue that such moral enhancements are required as 
a result of our achievements in collective cognitive enhance-
ment, which have enabled us, as a species, to develop to the 
level of scientific and technological success at which we 
currently sit. This success has allowed for the development 
of several avenues through which UH can be brought into 
realisation. Some of these have been created to be deliber-
ately destructive (nuclear weapons, biological warfare, the 
proliferation of global injustices via mass-misinformation). 
In contrast, others have a foundation in a prevailing apathy 
to alter behaviour in order to avoid them (climate change, 
antibiotic resistance, the spread of zoonotic diseases). Con-
sequentially, “[t]he expansion of our powers of action as the 
result of technological progress must be balanced by moral 
enhancement on our part” (Savulescu and Persson 2012, p. 
400). A failure to do so would allow for a collective cog-
nitive capacity that eclipses the collective moral capacity, 
resulting in deliberative or accidental UH.
Additionally, Persson and Savulescu argue that as the 
capabilities of science and technology increase, so too does 
the likelihood that small groups of people, or even individu-
als, will be able to procure weapons or technologies enabling 
them to cause significant harm to millions of people (Pers-
son and Savulescu 2008, p. 168). Furthermore, even if the 
number of individuals who would wish to use these weapons 
to such effect is only a tiny fraction of human beings, due to 
the sheer numbers of people alive today, this fraction would 
be large enough to present a credible threat. Persson and 
Savulescu argue, therefore, that the progress of science is 
potentially making the world a worse place in which to exist 
due to the increasing likelihood of both destructive climate 
change or the misuse/mismanagement or unjust deployment 
of weapons of mass destruction. They conclude that:
If safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there 
are strong reasons to believe that their use should be 
obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, 
since those who should take them are least likely to 
be inclined to use them. That is, safe, effective moral 
enhancement would be compulsory (Persson and 
Savulescu 2008, p. 174).
For Persson and Savulescu then, compulsory MBE is neces-
sary for the intervention to be effective at its goal of prevent-
ing UH. Affording individuals the choice regarding whether 
they should undergo MBE allows the risk of UH to remain 
a distinct threat as those most in need of enhancement are 
those least likely to undergo it. Given that developments in 
science and technology make it increasingly more accessi-
ble for smaller and smaller groups of people to bring about 
this destruction, leaving these individuals unenhanced is too 
great a risk to take.
Persson and Savulescu’s conclusion that MBE would 
need to be compulsory has, unsurprisingly, met several 
counterarguments. Harris offers a nuanced critique of spe-
cific forms of MBE that enhance morality through the direct 
alteration of emotions via biomedical means. This contrasts 
his tempered enthusiasm for moral enhancement via the 
alteration of cognitive functions (Harris 2011, 2013, 2014, 
2016). Harris’ trepidation regarding specific forms of MBE 
is expressed chiefly in three main arguments.
Firstly, he is sceptical of the necessity of such interven-
tions as a single measure of combatting unethical behaviour, 
believing that rather than an emotionally targeted form of 
MBE, what is needed instead is a cognitive enhancement 
(Harris 2011, p. 110). Second, he expresses concerns regard-
ing the removal of the ability to act unethically, saying that 
“[w]ithout the freedom to fall, good cannot be a choice; 
and freedom disappears and along with it virtue. There is 
no virtue in doing what you must” (Harris 2011, p. 104). 
According to Harris, a MBE which prevents someone from 
acting unethically eliminates any possibility of acting ethi-
cally as to do so requires a choice; acting ethically cannot be 
as simple as falling off a log. Harris’ third concern focuses 
on the potential for MBE to have the opposite effect which 
it intends, leading not to an increase of ethical behaviour but 
rather to a moral decline. He writes that “the sorts of traits 
or dispositions that seem to lead to wickedness or immoral-
ity are also the very same ones required not only for virtue 
but for any sort of moral life at all” (Harris 2011, p. 104). 
As such, it can be assumed from this that the prospect of a 
5 It should be noted that in the same issue of the Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, another significant paper on MBE was published, this 
one by Douglas. His paper, entitled Moral Enhancement, presented 
an argument in favour of MBE. However, it does so via a more mod-
erate degree than that of Persson and Savulescu, omitting suggestions 
to the compulsory and universal application of MBE.
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compulsory programme of enhancement, as envisioned by 
Persson and Savulescu, would be something which Harris 
would oppose.
Rakić (2013), another vocal critic of MBE, considers not 
whether compulsory MBE would deprive individuals of 
their capacity for free decision making on an individual level 
but from a top-down, existential societal view. He argues 
that by making MBE compulsory, the state would not just 
encroach upon the fundamental freedoms of its citizens, but 
also potentially deprive them of their collective capacity for 
morality itself. In turn, this would deny everyone a vital 
aspect of human existence and be itself a form of UH. He 
concludes that:
We need to make a choice between preserving freedom 
as an essential marker of our distinctively human exist-
ence and obtaining additional assurances that human-
ity will survive by making ME [Moral Enhancement] 
obligatory. If we opt for the former, we will safeguard 
an essential component of our human status. If we opt 
for the latter, we might possibly feel more confident 
that humanity will survive, but we do so only at the 
cost of giving up on a key element of our specifically 
human existence (Rakić 2013, p. 5).
For Rakić, implementing a programme of compulsory MBE 
is committing an act of UH, one that, while possibly safe-
guarding against the dangers of warfare or cataclysmic cli-
mate change, causes untold existential harm. As such, while 
he concedes that the development of MBE may indeed be 
necessary to prevent UH, its use should not be compulsory. 
Instead, he argues that it should be employed, in a volun-
tary capacity, in tandem with ‘classical’ compulsory moral 
enhancement measures, such as education and socialisation; 
that is, people should be encouraged to take MBE, but not 
coerced.6
Persson and Savulescu responded to Rakić’s position and 
criticised the idea that MBE is an UH because it infringes on 
one’s ability to make free and autonomous decisions (Pers-
son and Savulescu 2013). They argue that the concept of 
unlimited free will, in which an agent can act in a manner 
not determined by the laws of physics and biology, is some-
thing which only an ultimate being has. This is something 
which our finite, mortal existence does not afford us. As 
such, MBE does not pose an unprecedented threat to our 
unrestricted free will as this is something which we have 
never possessed. MBE is simply another causal factor which 
influences our behaviour, just in a singularly ethical way. 
They also note that not all restrictions to our freedom are 
negative, giving the examples of disgust at eating faeces and 
an aversion to hurting or harming others. From here, they 
argue that “some non-voluntary restrictions to our freedom 
are beneficial” (Persson and Savulescu 2013, p. 2).
Rakić responds to these criticisms, and furthers his argu-
ments, in his 2017 paper. He criticises Persson and Savules-
cu’s concept of freedom of will as a matter of degree and 
instead argues that it is a threshold concept, one which com-
pulsory MBE endangers. He concludes that “compulsory 
moral bioenhancement deprives humans not of a degree 
of their free will, but of their (experience of) free will in 
general. As free will is a key component of our humanity, 
compulsory moral bioenhancement lowers our moral status” 
(Rakić 2017, p. 392). The issue of freedom, then, is a central 
sticking point in the MBE debate and one which acts as a 
foundation upon the ethical permissibility of compulsory 
and voluntary MBE.
A balance, therefore, needs to be struck between the need 
for compulsory MBE (as a means for ensuring sufficient 
uptake) to prevent UH, and the conceptualisation of manda-
tory MBE as, in fact, itself a form of UH. A compromise 
should be sought that can provide a programme of MBE 
that is both voluntary to avoid the risk of existential UH 
and state-sanctioned moral paternalism, but simultaneously 
sufficient enough to reduce the risk of UH via altering the 
behaviour of those who are most likely to put humanity, and 
the planet, at risk. Ideally then, what is needed is a model of 
MBE that would be as effective as a compulsory programme 
as envisioned by Persson and Savulescu, without itself need-
ing to be mandatory; a model which allows for the ‘posi-
tive’ altering of behaviours, even in those individuals who 
have not undergone MBE. This leads us to epidemiological 
modelling, which this paper suggests can provide a viable 
solution to this problem.
Epidemiology outside health
Epidemiology is the “study of how often diseases occur in 
different groups of people and why. Epidemiological infor-
mation is used to plan and evaluate strategies to prevent ill-
ness and as a guide to the management of patients in whom 
disease has already developed” (The BMJ 2018). Epidemiol-
ogy is the top-down study of how a subject moves through 
and replicates within a population, and how steps can be 
taken to disrupt this movement with the eventual goal of 
elimination. Elimination is achieved through the disruption 
of the infection chain. One of the most well-known methods 
in which this is achieved is through the tactical deployment 
of vaccinations. However, while it is commonly associated 
with the study of pathological contagions concerning health-
states, its models and methodologies have been taken up 
6 Where exactly the line is between promotion and coercion is a 
sticky point of contention and one which Rakić does not elaborate on 
in any great detail.
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in other disciplines to achieve similar, albeit fundamentally 
different, results.
The mechanisms that underpin the theories and observa-
tions in epidemiology have been employed as an analogy for 
understanding trends in a variety of complexly structured 
sectors, including communication (Eubank et al. 2008), 
criminology (Akers and Lanier 2009), linguistics (Enfield 
2013), fanatic behaviours (Castillo-Chavez and Song 2003), 
terrorist ideology (Lafferty et al. 2008), and finance (Peck-
ham 2014; Moellendorf 2020). The reason that epidemiol-
ogy has proven useful as an analogy in the generation of 
insight and theories in these sectors is due to the similarities 
they share; specifically regarding the identification, trans-
mission, and management of risk and the behaviour of ‘con-
tagions’ in complexly dynamic organisations.
As just one prominent example, economists drew on 
epidemiological literature regarding emerging infections 
to understand the transmission channels of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, and how smaller players in the global finan-
cial market were able to produce systemic fluctuations to the 
local and global economy. The epidemiologically influenced 
economic models created enabled economists to identify 
pathways through which shock could travel between previ-
ously assumed minimally connected markets. Commenta-
tors noted that “informed by epidemiological research, the 
focus turned to indicators of exposure and the relationship 
between exposure to ‘infection’. The goal of financial ‘con-
tagion’ theory was ultimately the ‘elaboration of causes’ to 
explain ‘patterns of disease occurrence’” (Peckham 2014, 
p. 14). The inclusion of epidemiological principles in the 
understanding of financial markets not only provided clar-
ity to misunderstood economic patterns but also brought to 
light previously overlooked influential factors, and was so 
successful that the term ‘contagion’ has since become part 
of the standard language used by international economists 
and policymakers (Claessens and Forbes 2004).
Epidemiology has proven to be a useful prism through 
which insights can be gleaned regarding the spread of ‘con-
tagions’ through similar complex systems. This paper pro-
poses that similar to its use in the fields of finance, com-
munications, and criminology, epidemiology can shed light 
on how a MBE could be capable of behavioural influence, 
without the need for such a measure to be compulsory, as 
proposed by Persson and Savulescu. To argue this point, 
however, a brief explanation of the dynamics of transmission 
and process of vaccination is needed.
Herd immunity and infection chain 
disruption
Vaccinations work by introducing either a weakened or dead 
version of a biological entity to an individual’s immune 
system. This introduction prompts that system to produce 
antibodies which, after the initial infection has been cleared 
from the body, remain to a degree within the blood. It is 
this continued presence which facilitates an active immunity 
and means that the individual is potentially less likely to 
become re-infected, or in some cases, less likely to suffer 
from infection-related complications. The immune system 
is enabled to react faster in cases of subsequent infection. 
This is known as the direct effect of vaccination (Halloran 
et al. 1991).
Vaccinations also have indirect effects, one of which is 
herd immunity.7 For a contagion, such as a biological path-
ogen, to spread throughout a population, three things are 
required. First is the agent, this is the contagion which will 
spread throughout any given population, such as the flu or 
measles. Second is a host, the individual who will incubate 
the agent and who is typically considered as being ill. Third, 
is a habitable environment an agent can utilise to travel to 
a new host. By eliminating one of these triadic factors, a 
contagion is unable to spread through a population and as 
such, over time and without subsequent infection reintroduc-
tion, the contagion can be eradicated. If enough of a popula-
tion undergo immunisation against a contagion, the chance 
of any individual host encountering a vulnerable person is 
reduced, which in turn decreases the spread of the contagion. 
Eventually, this reduction occurs to such a degree that the 
contagion is unable to spread so fast that a population can-
not recover from it; what is commonly known now, thanks 
to the COVID-19 pandemic, as having an r value less than 
one. Therefore, the prevalence of contagion eventually falls. 
This fall, in conjunction with other forms of intervention, 
can eventually lead to the complete eradication of conta-
gion from a population, and in the most successful cases, 
its complete wild-extinction, as with Smallpox in the 1980s 
(Fenner 1988).
Smith identified that for this herd immunity to take place 
a certain proportion of a population must undergo immuni-
sation (Smith 1970). The minimum number of individuals 
that need to undergo vaccination in order for herd immunity 
to take effect is known as the ‘herd immunity threshold’ 
(Mallory et al. 2018). Below this threshold, a contagion 
is likely to propagate, above the threshold, it is unlikely to 
propagate successfully. The threshold differs according to 
environmental, agent, and host factors. Therefore, for an 
7 Another term for this effect is ‘herd effect’. However, for the pur-
poses of this paper, the term herd immunity will be employed.
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accurate threshold for any particular contagion to be identi-
fied, these individualised factors must be carefully consid-
ered. Herd immunity is important because it protects the 
vulnerable subpopulation of individuals who have not under-
gone immunisation themselves, for whatever reason. These 
individuals become insulated from infection by a contagion 
when herd immunity is established, and thus they can gain 
from the benefits of immunisation without actually having 
to be immunised themselves.
This paper will demonstrate how this phenomenon of 
herd immunity can be utilised in the discussion regarding 
MBE. Specifically, it posits that if enough of a population 
were to undergo MBE and pass what would be the equiva-
lent of the MBE threshold, then the prevalence of morally 
undesirable behaviour could decrease. Such a moralising 
effect of MBE would alter not only the actions of those who 
undergo MBE but also those who have not as a result of 
its indirect effect. Such an argument, however, depends on 
establishing that there is a similarity between (un)desirable 
behaviour/morality and the spread of biological contagions. 
Such a comparison has been well explored in the literature 
on social contagions.
Social contagions
The view that ideas, behaviours, concepts, and specifically 
morality, spread through populations in an analogous man-
ner to that of a contagion is nothing new. In 186 B.C., the 
Roman historian Livy wrote of the Bacchanalia orgies that 
“[t]his pernicious scourge made its way from Etruria to 
Rome like a spreading infection…” (Livy 2018, p. 231). 
The comparison between the spread of behaviours and that 
of disease continued from this point, through the various 
‘dancing plagues’ of the middle ages (Miller 2017), becom-
ing notably popular around the end of the nineteenth century, 
prominently featuring in the works of Baldwin (1894), le 
Bon ([1895] 2001), and de Tarde (1903). Each of whom 
was interested in the behaviour of crowds and of ‘group 
suggestion’.
The theory of behaviour as contagious has more recently 
been employed to understand and model specific patterns 
of behaviours in individual organisations and groups, as 
illustrated in the work of Gladwell (2001), Sooknanan and 
Comissiong (2017), House (2011), Robinson and O’Leary-
Kelly (1998), Connolly and Åberg (1993), Bettencourt et al. 
(2006), as well as Ambrose et al. (2013). Each argued that 
rather than considering the behaviour of individuals on a 
micro-level, individual behaviours could be understood on 
a macro-level, with their prevalence and movement traced 
according to the same mechanisms at play in epidemiology. 
Such an approach can furnish researchers and policymakers 
with the behavioural information required to make informed 
decisions regarding the management of groups when data is 
scant or when theories need verification.
Envisioning behaviours, according to these macro-level 
models, can enable interested parties to predict the move-
ment of undesirable behaviours and potentially implement 
measures to restrict the spread of radical and destructive 
ideologies. This includes phenomena as severe as fanatic 
behaviours (Castillo-Chavez and Song 2003), terrorist ideol-
ogy (Lafferty et al. 2008), as well as violent crime and bur-
glary (Ormerod et al. 2001). Such an approach, regarding the 
threat of terrorism, has even been acknowledged by the US 
Department of Homeland Security, according to whom “the 
capabilities and laws we rely upon to defend America against 
terrorism are closely linked to those which we rely upon to 
deal with non-terrorist phenomena such as crime, natural 
disease, natural disasters, and national security incidents” 
(Office of Homeland Security 2002, p. 4). Additionally, with 
the advent of social media and the unprecedented rate at 
which messages, ideologies, and opinions are now commu-
nicated, this field is receiving increasing interest with more 
complex behavioural contagion models being developed to 
attempt to account for this technological method of trans-
mission (Piedrahita et al. 2018; Sprague and House 2017).
In their study observing the contagiousness of rudeness 
within organisations, Foulk et al. (2016) noted that the trans-
mission of undesirable behaviours is not just limited to the 
interaction between the original ‘infected’ individual and 
those with whom they come into contact. Third parties with 
whom the second-generation infected individual interacts 
with are just as at risk of becoming behaviourally infected, 
even though they never interact with the negative behav-
ioural progenitor. Consequently:
…like a true virus, the effects of even a single act of 
rudeness may manifest themselves in multiple par-
ties within the organization. Accordingly, we specifi-
cally hypothesize that the rudeness of the first party 
will have indirect affective, cognitive, and behavioral 
effects for third parties (Foulk et al. 2016, p. 53).
A pattern of rude behaviour can propagate itself through 
the replication of its behaviours within an individual, which 
are then passed onto another via direct or indirect contact. 
Crucially, this process is not restricted to a single generation 
but can potentially continue ad infinitum, provided that sus-
ceptible individuals are exposed to the behaviour within an 
environment which allows for its transmission. This is made 
all the more possible given that “like the common cold, the 
types of negative behaviours that can be contagious are eve-
rywhere” (Foulk et al. 2016, p. 50). Indeed, unlike many bio-
logical contagions that require exact conditions under which 
to spread, as specialised vectors can only infect a particular 
type of host, behaviours can infect anyone, at any time, and 
are dispersible across a substantial range.
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Furthermore, according to multiple studies, much like 
the broader breadth of behaviour, both desirable, as well as 
undesirable moral attitudes and behaviours, are also commu-
nicable (Huddart and Qu 2013; Eskine et al. 2013; Hofmann 
et al. 2014). Concordantly, there is a case to be made, or a 
hypothesis to be put forward, that a significant, influential 
factor in the creation of an instance of immoral behaviour is 
a preceding case of immoral behaviour; one begets the other.
However, as with the transmission of biological conta-
gions, if the chain of replication of negative behaviour is 
interrupted, then that behaviour would cease to be passed 
on and eventually it would be subsumed by the desir-
able contagious behaviours, which work according to the 
same principle of transmission and replication (Bass et al. 
1987), provided that no new instances of rude behaviours 
were introduced to the population. For example, if one 
was to introduce a rudeness inhibitor which would radi-
cally decrease the disposition of individuals to be rude, at a 
level high enough to exceed what this paper will term ‘the 
behavioural immunity threshold’, not only would this work 
towards preventing instances of new rudeness occurring 
(the direct effect), but also interrupt the chain of transmis-
sion of rude behaviours by dramatically reducing the chance 
of a vulnerable individual from coming into contact with 
such behaviours (the indirect effect). Consequentially, even 
those individuals who have not undergone rudeness inhibi-
tion would, to a degree, be insulated against the contagious 
rudeness of others and as such benefit from the herd immu-
nity of the organisational enhancement.
It is along this line of thinking that this paper wishes to 
move, but rather than discussing the contagiousness of low-
intensity negative behaviours like rudeness, it will consider 
how MBE can interrupt the transmission chain of ‘ultra-
high-intensity’ negative behaviours, such as those which can 
potentially lead to UH, and as such be effective without the 
need to be compulsory.
MBE and the herd immunity of morality
The understanding of MBE as employed by Persson and 
Savulescu acknowledges the direct effect of the enhance-
ment, but not its indirect effect. According to their inter-
pretation, only individuals who undergo the enhancement 
are those who will reap any benefit regarding an alteration 
to their moral faculties. These individuals would no longer 
‘generate’ behaviours likely to bring about UH, and as such, 
due to this process being, in essence, insular, every indi-
vidual would need to undergo it in order to eradicate unethi-
cal behaviours from the target population; be that a city, 
country, or more likely given the scale of UH, the planet. 
To leave a single individual unenhanced would allow for 
the endurance of the risk of UH, making the efforts of those 
who have undergone MBE redundant as this small group 
could undo the morally beneficial behaviours of the larger 
populace. However, this interpretation ignores the potential 
indirect effect of MBE in two key ways: the interruption of 
the transmission of morally undesirable behaviours, and the 
contagious quality of behaviours that are morally desirable.
First, if a large enough proportion of the target populace 
underwent MBE so as to reach the behavioural herd immu-
nity threshold, then the transmission of undesirable behav-
iours would begin to decline. This is due to the removal of 
the susceptible host from the transmission triad, as discussed 
earlier. The difference now is that in the previous triad the 
entity being transmitted was a biological agent, whereas now 
it is a form of behaviour. Those people who perpetuate unde-
sirable behaviours would encounter the morally unenhanced 
in smaller and smaller numbers, and as such, the chances for 
them to spread their behaviours would also decrease. This 
decrease would have a ripple effect, reducing the instances 
of systematically generated undesirable behaviours not only 
in the first instance but also any subsequent ‘infections’. As 
such, the chances of any singular individual coming into 
contact with a person from whom they could catch a nega-
tive behavioural contagion would decrease over time. This 
conceptualisation is similar to how some radical and violent 
crimes have been mapped, and measures planned, with the 
goal of curtailing their spread (Sooknanan et al. 2013).
By disrupting the chain of behavioural infection, one can 
steadily reduce the prevalence of undesirable behaviours 
until those behaviours only occur spontaneously. At this 
point, more contemporary forms of moral enhancement, 
such as education and social interaction, can come into 
play, tackling the source of these negative behaviours. This 
parallels how, in cases where immunisation has not been as 
effective as desired, and an individual becomes ill with a 
biological agent, other medical services are offered to assist 
in their recovery and prevent the spread of that pathogen.
This, in turn, relates to the potential for UH which small 
groups or individuals can pose. Namely, that even with the 
effect of a behavioural herd immunity taking hold, insulat-
ing the unenhanced against behaviours that could lead to 
UH, this does not categorically prevent such an UH from 
coming about. Small groups or individuals seeking to cause 
deliberately UH are not directly prevented from doing so 
by the effect of behavioural herd immunity. However, this 
paper is not suggesting that such an effect is, in-and-of-itself, 
sufficient to prevent such an outcome. Other social meas-
ures and institutions—such as the police, counterterrorism, 
environmental agencies, amongst others—will still need to 
exist as a means of tackling such sporadic instances of UH 
causing behaviours. What this paper is suggesting is that 
the instances and spread of such behaviours could be sig-
nificantly reduced through a voluntary programme of MBE 
to the same degree as would be provided by a compulsory 
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programme. This would then allow for contemporary meas-
ures and institutions to target their time and resources on the 
instances and individuals who remain a threat.
Second, the decrease in the transmission of immoral 
behaviours is not the only indirect effect that this paper 
postulates MBE could have. The enhancement could also 
increase the instances of people behaving in morally desir-
able ways and crucially, these morally desirable behaviours 
are subject to the same transmission phenomena as their 
negative counterparts (Mayer et al. 2009). One can ‘catch’ 
behaviour that would increase the likelihood of ‘ultimate 
good’,8 just as one can ‘catch’ those behaviours which lead 
to UH. As such, at the same time that those individuals 
who have not undergone MBE would become less likely to 
interact with someone from whom they would catch a nega-
tive behavioural contagion, they would also be immersed 
in an environment saturated with people acting in a mor-
ally positive way due to their undergoing MBE. This means 
that those individuals would be at a high ‘risk’ of contract-
ing beneficial behavioural traits, regardless of whether they 
have been enhanced, due to the sheer number of individuals 
with whom they would come into contact. This would then 
reinforce and maintain positive behavioural traits because 
the unenhanced would constantly be ‘re-infected’ with the 
desirable behavioural contagions.
In a population in which the vast majority of individuals 
have undergone MBE then, it is not beyond the realm of pos-
sibility that the population would be protected from a self-
inflicted UH as a result of the disparity between their moral 
and cognitive faculties. If behaviours act like contagions, 
which this paper has suggested they do, then it is possible 
that other epidemiological phenomena can be observed in 
the formation and spread of behaviour, such as herd immu-
nity. Consequently, while it would indeed be necessary for a 
large proportion of individuals to undergo MBE in order for 
the collective effect of herd immunity to take hold, and there 
is room for discussion about how this might be achieved vol-
untarily, this is significantly different from arguing that such 
an intervention would need to be compulsory to be effective.
Conclusion
The phenomenon of herd immunity is one that is critical in 
the field of vaccine epidemiology and public health. Once 
it takes effect, even those individuals who are unable to 
undergo vaccination are still able to benefit from a functional 
immunity from a biological agent. As such, a compulsory 
and universal programme of vaccination is not always nec-
essary to achieve a sufficient protection rate against a con-
tagious biological agent. It is this same line of reasoning 
which this paper has sought to employ, envisioning MBE as 
a form of vaccination against those types of behaviour that 
would lead to the realisation of UH. Consequentially, this 
allows for the possibility of sufficient protection against the 
undesirable behaviours that would lead to UH without a need 
for a universal and compulsory enhancement programme.
This stands in contrast to the claim made by Persson and 
Savulescu that in order for MBE to be meaningfully effective 
at eliminating UH it would need to be compulsory (Persson 
and Savulescu 2008, p. 174). This paper has argued that a 
voluntary programme of MBE could be effective at reducing 
or eliminating the risk of UH provided that a large enough 
portion of a population undergoes the measure. This would 
not only disrupt the transmission chain of undesirable behav-
iours but also provide an environment in which the morally 
unenhanced are likely to ‘catch’ morally positive behaviours, 
decreasing the chance of UH while increasing the likelihood 
of an ‘ultimate good’.
This paper recognises that the number of individuals 
who would need to undergo MBE in order to achieve this 
effect would need to be significant to meet the enhancement 
threshold. Further research would need to be undertaken 
in order to identify where this threshold is, and even then, 
it may be impossible to identify due to the complexity of 
human behaviours, the diversity of environments in which 
people live, and the multitude of ways in which individuals 
and groups interact. However, the difficulty of identifying 
this point is not the same as saying that such a threshold does 
not exist, nor that the only way to ensure humanity’s sur-
vival is to enforce a programme of compulsory MBE. There 
remains the possibility that such a threshold is so high as to 
require compulsory MBE as the only means to achieve it. 
However, this is not a given, and until it is demonstrated that 
compulsory MBE is the only method for averting the threat 
of UH, then it would seem premature to argue in its favour. 
This is especially true if the same effect sought by Persson 
and Savulescu can be realised via less coercive means.
The question also remains regarding why anyone would 
come forward to undergo voluntary MBE, let alone a large 
enough proportion of the population to bring into effect a 
behavioural herd-immunity. After all, governments globally 
increasingly struggle to maintain vaccination rates. A poten-
tial motivator could be a sense of duty and social responsi-
bility; that one should do their part not only to further their 
ends but because they have a responsibility to act morally 
for the good of others. Rakić postulates that there could 
be a motivation derived from a self-interested desire to be 
happy, arguing that the more moral one is, the happier they 
tend to be, and vice versa. As such, if one wants to increase 
8 Ultimate good, in the context of this paper, is taken to be merely 
the opposite of UH. Whether that entails a continuation of the status 
quo, or a refutation in favour of a state of existence even more benefi-
cial, is something which this paper does not intend to explore.
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the likelihood of being happy, then it would arguably be in 
their interests to volunteer for MBE (Rakić 2018). Given the 
recent concerns from some of the global populace regarding 
a COVID-19 vaccination, Rakić’s suggestion appears less 
than convincing.
More work on the comparison between MBE, vaccina-
tions, and behavioural contagions is needed before a defini-
tive answer to the question of whether MBE should(n’t) be 
compulsory is found. However, with a low likelihood of a 
universal compulsory programme of MBE being enacted for 
a variety of political, ethical, and social reasons, any way to 
achieve the security from UH without enforced enhancement 
is likely to be crucial.
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